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NOTES
ENFORCEMENT OF PRIORITY AND RATIONING REGULATIONS
PRIORITY and rationing are controls used to bring order into the tangle
of a wartime economy;' techniques for their enforcement have importance,
therefore, in preventing breakdowns in the intricate machinery of regulation.
The number of violations 2 need not be large to constitute a serious problem.
Evasion of a ruling by one firm puts strong pressure on all competitors to
retaliate in an effort to hold peacetime customers, while the tendency toward
violation and counter-violation is aggravated by the large amount of consumer
income seeking outlets in restricted civilian goods. Upon adequate enforce-
ment, as well* as upon modes of regulation which take account of these
pressures, rests the successful direction of war production.
The powers of Congress are broad, and are enhanced in war. Congress
can authorize the use of priority,3 of preference ratings,4 of material allo-
cation and compulsory orders, 5 and of production and inventory controls.0
1. Priority assigns preference ratings to government and civilian orders in an effort
to coordinate production in terms of time. BARUCH, AMERIcAN INDUSTRY IN T1I9 WAR
(1941) 47. Rationing is concerned with the allocation of scarce materials, and is there-
fore a coordination of production in terms of supply. Id. at 59. The methods are com-
plementary with rationing growing in importance as all materials become "scarce." See
N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1941, p. 1, col. 3.
2. "Surveys of 3500 firms for priority violations have been made by the Compliance
Branch of the War Production Board since it was established last June, the WPB an-
nounced last week . . .
"About 1600 of the 3500 completed reports reveal no violations of priority orders
and about the'same number reveal violations of a minor nature, largely through niisun-
derstanding. Of the small number found to have violated the orders, punitive action
will probably be recommended in the more serious cases." (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK
2659.
For an account of the widespread bootlegging of tires in contravention of ration-
ing orders, see Time, May 4, 1942, p. 73.
3. See Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 261 (1929);
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919).
4. See Mawhinny v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, 231 N. Y. 290, 297, 132 N. E. 93, 97
(1921).
5. Atwater v. United States, 275 U. S. 188 (1927); Omnia Commercial Co. v.
United States, 261 U. S. 502 (1923); Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore & Tierney, 265
Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 498 (1920).
6. Such controls were not used in World War I, and their validity has not been
adjudicated. They would seem constitutionally sound under the broad sweep of the war
power. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622 (1931).
This authority has been delegated to the President by three acts,1 and he,
in turn, has delegated such powers to administrative boards and officials.8
Complaints as to violations of the regulations which stem from these pow-
ers come mainly from the public, complemented by results of investigations
carried on by the various industry branches within the agency. These com-
plaints are sifted by officials of the compliance branch before proceedings
are begun.9
A variety of enforcement methods exists here, of which two are available
without resort to the courts: suspension of production and commandeering.
Suspension of production was the chief tool in the hands of the War Indus-
tries Board 10 in World War I. Since its priority orders had no statutory
basis, the Board was unable to enforce them through the injunctive process,
and therefore used the threat of exercising its statutory power to withhold
fuel" ' and transportation facilities' 2 from recalcitrant producers. After the
railroads were taken over by the government. 13 the threat was sufficiently
impressive to make priority violations rare.' 4 The comparable weapon in the
hands of the War Production Board 15 today is a ban on the offender's supply,
production or assembly of the good for a period of time. The Office of Price
Administration 16 has also used this method for punishing tire rationing vio-
lations.' 7 Although the method of proceeding is summary, the procedural
protections provided in other governmental agencies were afforded the Cen-
tral Pattern and Foundry Company of Chicago before its aluminum operations
were suspended.' 8 Provision for notice, hearing, representation by counsel,
7. 54 STAT. 676 (1940), as amended by Pub. L. No. 89, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (May
31, 1941), and as amended by Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942).
8. Jurisdiction over priorities now rests with the War Production Board. -xec.
Order No. 9024, 7 FED. REG. 329 (1942), Exec. Order No. 9040, 7 Fa. REG. 527 (1942),
Exec. Order No. 9125, 7 FxED. R.. 2719 (1942).
From the same statutory authority, the Office of Production 'Management was vested
with rationing powers by executive order. Exec. Order No. 829, 6 FED. R G. 191 (1941),
Exec. Order No. 8875, 6 FED. REG. 4483. Basic general rationing powers are derived
by OPA from WPB Directive No. 1, 7 FED. REG. 562, and supplemented by WPB Di-
rectives Nos. la to II inclusive.
9. (1941) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2208. The War Labor Board is decentralizing its
enforcement functions through regional offices. N. Y. Times, June 7, 1942, §3, p. 1,
col. 3.
10. The board was established by a letter from President Wilson to Bernard Baruch
on March 4, 1918, and given de jure sanction in a later executive order. BAnRcn, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 24.
11. The Food and Fuel Act of 1917. 40 STAT. 276 (1917), gave the Board power to
regulate the production, sale, and distribution of fuel.
12. The Act of Aug. 10, 1917, gave the President power to "direct . . . priority or
preference in transport by any common carrier by railroad, water, or otherwise
40 STAT. 272 (1917).
13. 40 STAT. 1733 (1917).
14. BARUCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 406.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. See note 8 supra.
17. (1942) 10 U. S. L. WErn 2620.
18, OPM Release PI 1387, Oct. 16, 1941.
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and intra-administrative appeal appears to be a general policy in these cases. 1
Although the statutes in question 20 are open to attack for failure to provide
for notice expressly, 21 courts are more likely to find "notice by implication"
in such statutes 22 and can indulge in the presumption that a public officer
will act lawfully.
23
Prior to the passage of the Second War Powers Act,24 this use of priority
to punish its own violators was one of the two weapons most suited to deal
with deliberate and open transgressions.2 5 With criminal penalties now pro-
vided by that Act, suspension will probably be less used, because its scope is
limited. Severe, and ill-suited to minor infractions, it is equally inapplicable
against a supplier whose good is important in war production; and even
when the product is non-essential, the method operates to reduce the supply
of goods in an inflationary period.
The second executive penalty available is commandeering. Section 9 of
the Selective Service Act 20 provides for general commandeering powers sup-
erseding those granted in the original Priorities Act.27 The provision is ap-
plicable only to orders placed directly by the government and therefore affects
only prime producers. Its function in the fields of priority and rationing has
been that of a threat and a deterrent. Lacking flexibility, it can hardly be
employed against minor violations, and the delays caused by changes in man-
agement might well outweigh its usefulness.
When the foregoing instruments are inadequate, judicial enforcement is
sought. Proceedings in this field have been begun by a recommendation to
the Justice Department by WPB. Although criminal suits are so treated by
OPA, it does its own civil prosecution. Clear-cut evidence of respective agency
jurisdiction here is lacking.28
19. "Adopting the procedure of the semi-judicial agencies, branch lawyers and the
accused argue the case before a compliance commissioner.
"On the basis of the commissioner's recommendation an S-order is drawn up and
submitted for approval to Director Knowlson of the Division of Industry Operationg.
The accused may appeal to Knowlson at this point: If Knowlson approves, the order is
issued." Business Week, March 21, 1942, p. 19. For the procedure adopted in rationing
cases by the Office of Price Administration, see (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEzK 2832.
20. See note 7 supra.
21. See Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928) ; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U. S. 413 (1915) ; Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907).
22. Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U. S. 643 (1930); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S.
110 (1922) ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903) ; Paulsen v. Portland,
149 U. S. 30 (1893).
23. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903); Shealy v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 131 S. C. 144, 158, 126 S. E. 622, 626 (1924) ; Hackley-Phelps-
Bonnell Co. v. Cooley, 173 Wis. 128, 179 N. W. 590 (1920).
24. Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942). See note 7 supra.
25. The other is the injunction.
26. 54 STAT. 892, 50 U. S. C. §309 (app.) (Supp. 1941).
27. See note 7 supra.
28. The writer has been unable to procure exact information on the situation from
the agencies involved. The questions one might ask are:
1. Does the Justice Department ever proceed in the courts without modi-
fying the recommendations received by it?
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Equitable enforcement of regulations deriving from statutory authority
has been Widely used.29 Courts have been willing to provide "appropriate
remedies" if the statute intends to impose legal obligations, even though spe-
cific penalties have not been provided, 0 and though technical equity juris-
diction is lacking.31 It is quite probable that Congress intended to impose
legal obligations by the Priorities Act.32 MXoreover, if the agency has re-
ceived a promise to conform, the courts would probably grant specific perfor-
mance based on the concept of benefits received through the order,. which
concept might also cover modification of the order.3- However, the agreement
can be considered a condition of the privileges derived rather than a promise
to conform.3 5
The injunction was successfully used to prevent the Chicago Alloy Products
Company from refusing to allow an inspection of its inventory and an audit
of its books as evidence of priority violations.30 Power to inspect and enter
is given by section 2(a) of the Priorities Act. This provision was intended
to be mandatory in regard to all information relevant to the administration
of the Act.3 7 When employed for any valid administrative purpose, such
provisions have been upheld both as to inspection of books and records and
as to physical entry.38
The weakness of the injunctive process is revealed by the current attempt
to prevent alleged infractions of steel priorities.39 As a method of preven-
2. Does the Justice Department ever refuse to proceed at all?
3. Does the Justice Department ever institute proceedings indepen-
dently and contrary to the wishes of WPB or OPA?
It is asserted that "the working relationship between OPA and the Department of
Justice has been close and effective." Communication to YAEZ LAw JouriAL from H. W.
Jones, Office of Price Administration. But with alternative methods of prosecution avail-
able, determination by OPA of the violations to be punished civilly restricts sharply the
discretion of the Justice Department.
29. See OPM Release PM 669, July 7, 1941.
30. Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937); Texas &
N. 0. Ry. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930). Injunctions have been successfully
obtained against rationing violations by OPA. Henderson v. Smith-Douglass Co., E. D.
Va., March 6, 1942; Henderson v. Bryan, S. D. Cal., March 23, 1942.
31. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); United States v. American Bond & Mort-
gage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D. Ill. 1929), aff'd. 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied, 285 U. S. 538 (1932); Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equily (1936)
50 HaRv. L. Rnv. 171, 228.
32. See H. R. REP. No. 460, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 5.
33. Compare United States v. Kraus, 33 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; United
States v. Gordin, 287 Fed. 565 (S. D. Ohio 1922).
34. See United States v. Kraus, 33 F. (2d) 406, 410 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
35. Compare United States v. Smith, 39 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
36. United States v. Chicago Alloy Products Co., (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2531.
37. See 87 CONG. Rvc. 3829 (1941).
38. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Co., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), rcv'd on
other grounds, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) ; Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1933). Corporations cannot claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment. See
Essgee v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 155 (1922); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69
(1906).
39. United States v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. and United States v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., (1942) 10 U. S. L. VEEK 2699.
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tion, the threat of injunction hardly carries the weight of original criminal
penalties. Further, the judicial procedure might not be speedy enough to
constrain a touching-off of counter measures by competitors. There may be
difficulty, also, in punishing for contempt one who has transgressed regula-
tions made after the granting of the injunction. 40 The worth of the weapon
seems to depend upon a fear of publicity as much as upon any other factor,
The government has been provided with an arsenal of criminal penalties.
Some statutes dealing with specific economic activities, for example, provide
penalties for violations of their conditions. The Selective Service Act
makes those failing to comply with its provisions guilty of a felony and
liable to fine and imprisonment. 41 It applies, however, only to orders placed
directly by the government. 42 The Federal Powers Act states that willful
or knowing violation of rules or orders deriving from its provisions is pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment. 43 This would seem to apply to all regula-
tions as to power distribution made thereunder. The Ship Warrants Act'1"
in section 6 makes willful violation of rules and orders issued under the Act
a crime. Orders issued under section 2 concerning freight rates, allocation
of cargo space, voyages, and use of shore facilities would seem to be covered
thereby. The penalties are strengthened by the fact that compliance with
the provisions of the warrant is usually made a condition of its validity.
Most producers are, however, affected only indirectly by these laws. Until
the Second War Powers Act 43 was passed, therefore, most deliberate viola-
tions could be punished only by suspension of production or by injunction.
Subsection (a) (1) of section 2 of that Act now makes willful performance
or neglect of a prohibition issued thereunder a misdemeanor punishable by
fine up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to one year. Two indictments have
already been voted under this section for rationing violations.40 Its effective-
ness is diluted by the facts that the maximum fine may be far less than the
profit to be gained from violation, and that the alternative of imprisonment
may be tempered by reluctance to deprive a large plant of its trained executives
in war time. Nevertheless, the stigma of a criminal prosecution works as a
powerful restraint, and the weapon is a necessary complement of enforce-
ment controls.
40. The complaints in the steel actions seek the enjoining of violations of regula-
tions "as may be made from time to time," in addition to prevention of infractions of
orders already in existence. A court may be reluctant either to grant such an injunc-
tion or, once granted, to punish for contempt a violator of such future orders, grounding
its refusal on the doctrine of lack of imminent injury. See SPELLING AND) Lawis, TrE
LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1926) § 33.
41. 54 STAT. 892, 50 U. S. C. § 309 (app.) (Supp. 1941).
42. Ibid.
43. 49 STAT. 862 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825(o)(b) (Supp. 1941).
44. Pub. L. No. 173, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 14, 1941).
45. Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942).
46. United States v. Stevenson, W. D. S. C., May 25, 1942; United States v. Wells,
W. D. S. C., May 25, 1942. The injunction actions against steel producers (see note 39
supra) were undertaken after the Act was passed, but the indictments allege no violations
as having occurred after the Act took effect.
The Second War Powers Act punishes open violations: Sections 3547
and 3748 of the Criminal Code are used to get at violations made under the
pretense of innocence. The Code provisions, especially useful in enforcement
of rationing, have been so employed.40 Section 35 makes a crime of false
claims, statements, or representations made for the purpose of defrauding
the United States or its officers. A line of decisions thereunder has held that
pecuniary damage to the government need not be shown, ° and that only in-
tent to deceive rather than actual deception need be proved.' 1 Further, the
holding that a false statement to one who deals directly with the government
is within the rubric of the section 2 would seem to allow prosecution of those
who make false statements to a prime producer under direct government
contract.
Section 37 grants a concomitant weapon by providing for fine or imprison-
ment for conspiracy "to defraud the United States in any manner or for
any purpose." Here, too, the courts have held that pecuniary or property
loss to the government is not the issue: the focus rather is upon a conspiracy
attempting to obstruct legitimate official action through fraud or trickery.
And a case has held that this provision applies to an attempt to impair an ad-
ministrative regulation which was promulgated without specific statutory au-
thority.5 4 The two statutes would seem to close all avenues of escape from
prosecution for misrepresentations to the government. They should prove
valuable aids in the enforcement of projected inventory controls,5 the Pro-
duction Requirements Plan, 6 and an increased rationing program.
A possibility for future use is a civil suit for damages. Such a suit would
be brought by those most likely to know of the violation and could be directed
against those who refuse to take a war order or those who violate regulations
by misusing materials obtained by priority. 57 The difficulty here is that few
47. 48 STAT. 996 (1934), as amended by 52 STAT. 197 (1938), 18 U. S. C. §S0
(Supp. 1941).
48. 21 STAT. 4 (1879), as amended by 35 ST.T. 1096 (1909), IS U. S. C. §8S3
(Supp. 1941).
49. United States v. LaSalle Motor Sales Corp.. (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2531.
50. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 (1941); United States v. Goldsmith,
10 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied. 309 U. S. 678 (1940), rehearing d-
nied, 310 U. S. 657 (1940), again denicd. 313 U. S. 597 (1941); United States v. Mel-
Ion, 96 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
51. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 (1941); United States v. Presser, 99
F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
52. United States v. Mellon, 96 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
53. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, 188 (1924); United States v.
Plyler, 222 U. S. 15 (1911); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462 (1910); Hyde v. Shine,
199 U. S. 62 (1905).
54. United States v. Janowitz, 257 U. S. 42 (1921).
55. N. Y. Times, March 15, 1942, § 3, p. 1, col. 2.
56. (1942) 10 U. S. L. WNEEK 2611. Under the plan, applicants submit figures on
present inventory and their needs for a projected three-month period.
57. See Comment (1942) 55 Hfiv. L. Riv. 427, 469. It is there suggested that re-
fusal by a sub-contractor to accept a defense order could be made cause for a claim of
triple damages, with the contract considered repudiated as of the date of rejection. An-
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would be likely to sustain actual damage in such cases, even if they proved
an infraction, such proof being extremely difficult without possession of a
detailed audit. Further, in this complex field administrative determination
of the transgressions to be punished would be lost.
Methods of enforcement change with the mode of regulation. Allocation
and rationing are rapidly restricting the scope of priority. 8 This develop-
ment carries with it a growing ease of exercise of the direct power to with-
hold supplies. Moreover, few will be able to escape governmental scrutiny
of their business activities. The Production Requirements Plan and close
inventory controls require detailed figures from producers, while the increase
in rationing brings the whole population of the nation within its scope. 9 But
this may not be enough. Enforcement agencies possess the instruments to
meet any development. Yet they must be warned of the need for their use;
the government can hardly supervise each of the countless transactions which
takes place within its borders. The prevention of widespread chiseling and
black-market operations depends, therefore, as much upon an alert citizenry
disposed to complain of infractions as upon an organized police.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAW APPORTIONING
INCIDENCE OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX*
ALTHOUGH earlier federal inheritance taxes' were levied on the receipt
of each legacy, the present federal estate tax 2 is assessed on the total net
estate and paid by the executor before distribution of the estate. Because
other proposal is that a supplier should be allowed to recover against a producer who
had misused materials obtained under a preference rating.
It is true that civil suits would provide close supervision of business behavior, but
there is danger in opening the door to constant harassment of businessmen by such suits.
Economic arrangements are so intermingled that a host of firms and individuals could
claim "damage" from an alleged violation; determination of their respective rights and
duties would clutter the courts for years to come.
58. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1941, p. 1, col. 3.
59. The revised gasoline rationing program to take effect in July reveals how de-
tailed this supervision can be. Coupons transmitted from consumer to dealer to sup-
plier, periodic inventories and audits, examination of certificates and reports by state tax
offices-all will be used in an effort to prevent bootlegging. N. Y. Times, June 8, 1942,
p. 1, col. 2.
*In re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. (2d) 131 (1941).
1. 1 STAT. 527 (1797) ; 12 STAT. 433, 485, 486 (1862) ; 13 STAT. 223, 285-91 (1864);
30 STAT. 448, 464-66 (1898) as amended 31 STAT. 946 (1901). As is evident from the
dates, these inheritance taxes were war-time revenue raisers. All were repealed shortly
after the emergency was over.
2. INT. Rav. CODE §§ 800-938 (1939), containing the basic estate tax imposed by
the Revenue Act of 1926 and subsequently'amended by the Revenue Acts of 1931, 1932,
1934, 1935, 1936, 1938, 1939, and 1941. The first federal estate tax was enacted by the Rev-
enue Act of 1916, §§ 200-12. Its basic principle, i.e., the collection of the tax from the
estate rather than from the beneficiary, has remained unchanged in subsequent legislation.
The controversial section 826(b) INT. REv. CODE (see p. 1206 infra) was also contained
in the original statute. 39 STAT. 779 (1916).
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it involves only one assessment and one collection, this form of death tax is
most advantageous from the administrative point of view. The statute itself
makes no provision for the incidence of the tax on the beneficiaries, and
unless there are clear testamentary directions the executor frequently faces the
question which funds of the estate are to be charged with the tax. If the
payment is made from the residuary estate, which is often left to the widow
and children, the burden falls on those whom the testator was presumably
most anxious to protect.4 On the other hand, since the tax is graduated on
the decedent's rather than on the beneficiary's ability to pay, apportionment
among the specific legatees may cast a disproportionate burden on the
recipient of a small legacy from a large estate.5
State courts, construing these provisions of the federal statute, have held
that, in the absence of clear testamentary directions, the tax falls on the
residuary legatee.6 The New York Court of Appeals, in the Hainin case,7
stated the rationale which came to be generally followed. Since Congress
had determined upon the net estate (rather than the specific legacies) as the
taxable unit, and thus departed from previous legislative practice, it was argued
that Congress must have intended to place the burden on the residuary estate.
The conclusion does not follow readily from the premise, and takes no account
of the probability that the extent of Congressional intent in measuring the
tax by the net estate had been to make the tax more certainly collectible and
to ease the administrative burden. Under the Hamlin approach the change
from specific legacy to nct estate in the measure of the tax carried with it
necessarily the change from specific to residuary legatee in the incidence of
the tax. In Phnckett v. Old Colony Trust Company 8 the Massachusetts
court arrived at the same conclusion by the same line of reasoning, and the
rule has been followed generally with unimportant variations.0
3. Section 826(c), however, expressly subjects the beneficiaries of insurance poli-
cies to the tax. See note 25 infra.
4. Report of the New York Decedent Estate Commission, New York Legisl. Doc.
No. 69, p. 226 (1930). In In re Benson's Estate, 120 Misc. 136, 198 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Surr.
Ct. 1923) the residuary estate failed to cover the New York and federal estate taxes.
5. This was the case in In re Mollenhauer's Will, 257 App. Div. 26, 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 619 (2d Dep't 1939). The decedent left a $3,000,000 estate with no provision as
to the payment of the tax. Under the New York apportionment statute the recipient of a
$10,000 legacy became liable for a $,000 tax.
6. Estate of Brown v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N. W. 320 (1924); Central Trust
Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P. (2d) 469 (1936) ; Lakes v. Lakes' Executors, 267 Ky.
684, 103 S. W. (2d) 86 (1937); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124
N. E. 265 (1919) ; Taylor v. Jones, 242 Mass. 210, 136 N. E. 382 (1922), cert. dei ed,
260 U. S. 742 (1922) ; Woodruff v. Holmes, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S. W. (2d) 616 (1931) ;
Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471, 200 At. 785
(1938); In re Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919), cert. denied sub nm. Hamlin
v. Wellington, 250 U. S. 672 (1919); Newton's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 361 (1920).
7. In re Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919), cerl. denied sub non. Hamlin
v. Wellington, 250 U. S. 672 (1919).
8. 233 Mass. 471, 124 N. E. 265 (1919).
9. Typical of the cases following the rule of the Hanlin case is Turner v. Cole, 118
N. J. Eq. 497, 179 Atl. 113 (1935). Variant results are reached in situations bearing some
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The question of the incidence of the estate tax was before the Supreme
Court in two cases decided on the same day in 1924. In Y.M.C.A. v. Davis1"
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision" which had held
that the tax was a debt of the decedent and that under Ohio law such debts
were payable by the residuary. The Ohio Supreme Court further found
indications on the face of the statute that the tax was to be born by the
residuary. Without committing the Supreme Court to fhis view, Chief Justice
Taft upheld the decision on the ground that the regulation of the incidence
of the tax was a matter of state determination along with other questions of
probate administration. He specifically stated that the law did not exempt
any legatee from contribution if by state law he was to share in the payment
of the tax. 12 In the companion Slocum case1 3 Justice Holmes arrived at the
same conclusion. As the decision of both these cases depended on the recog-
nition of state law 1 4 by the Supreme Court, the New York court's reference
to the pertinent holdings as dicta seems unjustified.
New York and Massachusetts, the initiators of the Congressional intent
approach, carried furthest the implications of this line of reasoning. Finding
in the federal statute an "explicit command" to put the burden on the
residuary, the New York court in very sweeping language refused to change
this rule, and by implication denied that it had power to do so.15 The testator
had to indicate his intention uhmistakably if he wanted to avoid the statutory
provisions as construed by the court. 10 The New York court thus created
analogy to that in the principal case. Martin v. Martin's Adm'r, 283 Ky. 513, 142 S. W.
(2d) 164 (1940) (apportionment allowed between personalty and realty in case of in-
testacy) ; the state follows the Hanlin rule, see Lakes v. Lakes' Executors, 267 Ky.
684, 103 S. W. (2d) 86 (1937). Thompson v. Union &.Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Ark.
411, 262 S. W. 324 (1924) (widow's dower exempted from contribution as a matter of
state law). Commercial Trust Co. of N. J. v. Millard, 122 N. J. Eq. 290, 193 Atl, 814
(1937) (beneficiary of an inter vivos trust held to contribute) ; the jurisdiction follows
the Hamlin rule, see Turner v. Cole, .mpra. New Hampshire first allowed apportionment
[Fuller v. Gale, 78 N. H. 544, 103 Atl. 308 (1918) ; Williams v. State, 81 N. H. 341,
125 At. 661 (1924); Foster v. Farrand, 81 N. H. 448, 128 Atd. 683 (1925)]; but has
recently adopted the Hanlin rule [Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege, 89 N. H. 471, 200 Atl. 786 (1938)].
10. 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N. E. 114 (1922).
11. See id. at 367, 140 N. E. at 114.
12. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 51 (1924).
13. Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924), affirming the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit which had held: "So far as the words of the statute are colncerned,
the United States does not care who ultimately bear the weight of this tax; it announces
the sum and demands payment from the executors; if the legatees and devisees cannot
agree to the burden-bearing, the state courts can settle the matter." 287 Fed. 651, 653
(1923).
14. In the Slocum case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had tried to take
advantage of the New York rule of tax incidence in calculating the net estate. Holding
that such use of the rules would lead to a lack of uniformity and confusion, since these
rules differed among the states, the Court did not allow the application of these rules in
calculating the estate.
15. In re Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 162 N. E. 79 (1928). Accord: Bemis v. Con-
verse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N. E. 686 (1923).
16. See In re Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 283, 162 N. E. 79, 81.
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its own dilemma by construing Congressional intent when the question before
the court was to be determined according to state law.
This solution judicially arrived at was much criticized, and, in New York,
was modified by statute in an attempt to protect widows and children,
the usual residuary legatees. Section 12417 of the Decedent Estate Law,
passed in 1930, provided that the surrogate is to apportion the federal and
New York estate taxes among the beneficiaries after payment has been
made by the executor. The testator still can exempt certain beneficiaries
by specifying where the burden of the tax is to rest. The practical effect
of this statute has been to create a presumption in favor of apportionment
and abolish the presumption placing the burden on the residuary.1 8 In 1937
Pennsylvania followed New York's example and enacted a similar statute.1 0
In both New York and Pennsylvania the constitutionality of these statutes
was upheld against claims that their enforcement would be an impairment
of the obligation of contract. 0
The constitutionality of the New York statute was again attacked in the
Del Drago2 case. Objecting to the apportionment of a $300,C00 tax, the
specific legatees charged that this statute violated the "supremacy" and
.'uniformity" clauses of the Federal Constitution. Since the apportionment
statute could not be reconciled with the rationale of the earlier New York
cases, the court was obliged either to change its incongruous position or to
declare the apportionment statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals
in a four to three decision chose the latter alternative and invalidated the
17. N. Y. Laws 1930, c. 709, § 124; N. Y. DECEDENT EsTATE LAw § 124. In addi-
tion to the provisions mentioned in the text, the law provides that the executor can re-
cover the taxes from any holder of any gross estate not under the exccutor's adminis-
tration. He does not have to distribute any part of the estate to the beneficiaries before
the tax has been paid and, if there has not yet been any apportionment, until adequate
security for tax payment has been obtained. The law became effective September 1, 1931.
13. In re Duryea's Estate, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. (2d) 3t9 (1933); In re Kauf-
man's Estate, 170 Misc. 436, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 616 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Meyner's
Estate, 173 Misc. 19, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 62 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
19. 20 PA. STAT. AN.N. (Purdon), 1941 Cumul. Annual Pocket Pt. § S44. After the
enactment of the Pennsylvania statute two-fifths of the revenue derived from the federal
estate tax was administered under these apportionment statutes. RP. Co Mi!x'R oF Ix:'.
REv. (1941) 59.
20. In re Scott's Will, 274 N. Y. 538, 10 N. E. (2d) 538 (1937), cert. denicd sub nor.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 302 U. S.
721 (1937). There is no impairment of the obligation of contract even if the statute is
applied to an inter vivos transfer made before its passage. In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc.
450, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 597 (Surr. Ct. 1939). The latter case discredited the claim that the
statute violated the "due process" clause. See, for the Pennsylvania statute, In re Jef-
fery's Estate, 333 Pa. 15, 3 A. (2d) 393 (1939).
21. In re Del Drago's Estate, 2_87 N. Y. 61, 33 N. E. (2d) 131 (1941), rceersing,
175 N. Y. Misc. 489, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (Surr. Ct. 1940). Surrogate Foley, v'ho
decided the case in the surrogate's court, was the Chairman of the New York Decedent
Estate Commission, which drew up and recommended the apportionment statute to the
legislature.
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statute by following the traditional approach of the Handin case and its
successors.
22
Even if one accepts the New York court's approach to the question, its
conclusions are open to doubt. The face of the federal statute gives detailed
directions about the payment of the tax, but the determination of incidence
is left largely to conjecture. In its attempt to read Congressional provisions
on this subject into the statute the New York court has relied heavily on
Section 826(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.m This section permits
persons other than the executor to be reimbursed by either the executor
or the recipients of legacies for any estate taxes they might have paid. This
provision was inserted into the statute without any debate on the floor of
either house, and seems primarily designed to insure the collection of the
tax before the distribution of the estate.24 Section 826(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, demanding proportionate contribution from beneficiaries of
life insurance of over $40,000, was added to the 1918 Revenue Act and
characterized as an administrative change. It was probably intended to
further strengthen Section 402(f) of the same Revenue Act, which for the
first time in the history of the estate tax expressly ordered the inclusion
of life insurance in the gross estate. 25 Although tax deficiencies can be col-
lected from any transferee, either under Section 827(b) or by a suit in equity,
the rights of transferees to contribution among each other cannot be ad-
justed in the proceedings; but in such cases apportionment can later be ob-
tained by another suit in equity.28
Congressional debates show no more than speculation about the incidence
of the tax, and an authoritative statement on the issue appears nowhere" 7
22. Matter of Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 162 N. E. 79 (1928) ; Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 633 (1925).
23. "If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of that part of the
estate passing to or in the possession of, any person other than the executor in his ca-
pacity as such, such person shall be entitled to reimbursement out of any part of the
estate still undistributed or by a just and equitable contribution by the persons whose
interest in the estate of the decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been paid
before the distribution of the estate or whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability
for the payment of taxes, debts, or other charges against the estate, it being the purpose
and intent of this subchapter that so far as practicable and unless otherwise directed by the
will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution."
24. See Comment (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 690, 692.
25. As life insurance usually passes under a contract to which the insurance com-
pany and the beneficiary are parties, the propriety of such proceeding had been doubted
and evasion of estate taxes by means of life insurance had seemed possible. H. Rra,. No.
767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) 42. For the constitutional and administrative difficul-
ties created by the inclusion of life insurance in the gross estate, see Paul, Life Insurance
and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HARV. L. Rav. 1037.
26. For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the transferee liability see 1 PAUl,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942) 764-66.
27. Cordell Hull, then a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, said:
"Under the general laws of descent the proposed estate tax would be first taken out of
the net estate before distribution, and distribution made under the same rule that would
otherwise govern it. Where the decedent makes a will he can allow the estate tax
[Vol. 511206
Congressman Kitchin, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee reporting this section of the bill, emphasized that the tax was collected
on the transfer of the net estate and that Congress was not interested in
how the beneficiaries fared.28 There is little evidence in the debates on the
floor of either house to support the view of the New York Court of Appeals
that the form of an estate tax was adopted as a compromise measure-
between those wanting to guard death taxes as a source of state revenue 0
and those desiring to obtain additional income for the national Government
from this profitable source.31 Little attention was paid to the nature of the
tax, i.e., that it was an estate rather than an inheritance tax, and the terms
were used interchangeably throughout the debates.32 The few times the form
of the tax was discussed its supporters extolled its administrative conveni-
ence.33 The only opposition to its methods came from Congressman Dillon,
who feared that apportionment, to which he objected, would be the inevitable
result.34 Since no indication of Congressional intent can be found eithe"
on the face of the statute or in the Congressional debates, the court's argu-
ment that the New York statute violates the "supremacy" clause of the
federal constitution is unsupported.
The court's view that the New York statute contravenes the "uniformity"
clause is equally untenable. The function of this clause in the constitution
is to keep Congress from discriminating betveen the states, so that geographi-
cal uniformity throughout the United States can be preserved.35 Only in
cases where application of state law actually would have interfered with
established federal tax procedure has the Supreme Court ignored state law.cO
As much of our present system of Federal taxation is affected by the opera-
tion of state law,37 it is evident that the Supreme Court does not consider
interdependence and interference synonymous terms.
to fasten on his net estate in the same manner, or if he objects to this equitable method
of imposing it upon the entire net estate before distribution he can insert a residuary
clause or other provision in his will, the effect of which would m6re or less change the
incidence of the tax." 53 Coxc. RPc. 10657 (1916). This statement is too vague and
speculative to show that there was any intent on the part of Congress that the tax should
be borne by the residuary.
28. 53 CONG. Rc. Appendix 1942 (1916).
29. In the report of the Ways and Means Committee on the estate tax there is a
suggestion that such considerations may have taken place in committee; see H. REP. No.
922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). As such views were never aired in the debates on
the floor of the House, they cannot be considered as having been generally accepted.
30. See 53 CoNG. REc. 10647, 10752, 13043-44, 13060, 13098; Appendix 1403, 1415,
1708 (1916).
31. See id. at 10596; Appendix 1398.
32. For a good example see Congressman Kitchin's speech, id. Appendix 1942 (1916).
33. Ibid; see also id. at 10596.
34. Id., Appendix 1495. See also id. at 105S3 (1916).
35. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
36. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940).
37. See PAUL, SELtcTED STUDIES IN FDmL TAXATIO.1 (2d series 1933) 7-18.
State rules have had an increased importance since Erie R. R. v. Tompldns, 304 U. S.
64 (1938). See Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of Slate Court De-
cisions (1942) 51 YjaE L. J. 783.
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The field of estate taxation is one where such overlapping occurs fre-
quently. Traditionally the administration of decedents' estates has been left
to the States,38 and after the executor pays the tax to the Federal Govern-
ment he accounts for such payment to the state courts. The state courts
have had to decide whether to allow the federal estate tax as an administrative
expense when calculating their own estate and inheritance taxes.89 The New
York statute is only one other step in the States' dealings with the estate
tax after payment has been made to the Federal Government. It regulates
the incidence of the tax only, a subject in which the Federal Government
has not yet evinced any interest, although for purposes of social policy it
might be desirable that it should do so.
Such an interest could take the form of either a federal statute expressly
fixing the incidence of the tax or one that would permit the States to do so.
As under our present system of estate taxation apportionment seems to pro-
vide the most equitable solution to the problem of tax incidence, apportion-
ment 40 by either Congress or by the States with Congressional permission
would be desirable. Action by the states separately would probably cause
less administrative difficulty, and a bill currently before Congress would allow
apportionment by the States.41 While such Congressional action would clarify
the determination of tax incidence in the future, many wills which relied on
the apportionment statute have been probated since the Del Drago case; and
the confusion caused in the administration of these wills can only be remedied
by a reversal of the Del Drago decision.
An express finding by the Supreme Court that the present estate tax
statute permits state determination of tax incidence would end the anomalous
situation created by the state courts' insistence on deciding state law by
investigating Congressional intent. This action might involve an expansion
of the views suggested in various cases which treat the tax either as n
administrative expense or as a debt of the estate,42 the liability for .which
is to be determined by the State. Such an approach to the problem would
be in line with the Y.M.C.A. and Slocmn decisions and vastly superior to a
search for a non-existent Congressional intent.
38. For a discussion of the problem caused by state dominance in a field which Is
so greatly influenced by federal action, see Cahn, Federal Regulation of Inheritance
(1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 297.
39. See, e.g., Corbin v. Townshend, 92 Conn. 501, 103 Atl. 647 (1918); People v.
Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919) ; Estate of Roebling, 89 N. J.
Eq. 163, 104 AtI. 295 (1918); Tax Comm. v. Lamprecht, 107 Ohio St. 535, 140 N. E.
333 (1923).
40. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. spra note 26, at 784; Comment (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv.
690, 699-701; Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes (1940) 54 HARv. L. Rtv.
10, 49.
41. H. R. 6257, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
42. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 367, 140 N. E. 114 (1922); Corbin v.
Townshend, 92 Conn. 501, 103 Atl. 647 (1918); Brown v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 109
N. W. 320 (1924) ; Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663 (1936).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SECONDARY PICKETING*
PICKETING, to be effective, must present to the public the facts of a labor
dispute in such a way that the public, entering the controversy, can force a
decision. When a product is sold through retail outlets, secondary picketing,1
directed against the employer's vendee, is the only effective means of pub-
licizing the facts of a labor contest. State courts, nevertheless, have gen-
erally refused to permit the picketing of "innocent" and "helpless" third
parties. 2 The power of the states to limit the area of peaceful picketing
assumed a constitutional aspect with the Thornhill case ; but not until two
recent decisions did the United States Supreme Court pass on the question
of freedom of speech in secondary picketing.4
In the Woll case members of the Bakery Drivers' Union, alarmed at the
inroads which the "peddler" or independent jobber system of distributing
bread was making into their ranks, sought to unionize the "peddlers". After
failing in that attempt, the Union picketed the retail stores which bought
from the "peddlers" as well as the bakeries whose products the latter handled.
The New York courts held that no "labor dispute" was involved within the
meaning of the state anti-injunction act and enjoined the admittedly peace-
ful picketing.5 In a unanimous holding the Supreme Court reversed on free
speech grounds.
* Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of Internat. Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Wohl, 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (U. S. 1942); Carpenters and Joiners Union of
America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (U. S. 1942).
1. Secondary picketing involves employees engaged in a primary labor dispute who
extend their activity so as to exert pressure on their employer's vendee. A secondary
strike, however, involves activity, not by employees engaged in the primary dispute, but
rather by other employees connected therewith through employment on the product which
is the subject of the primary dispute. See 1 TELLEm, L.%roR DispurrEs AND COLL.rVM
BARGAINING (1940) § 122.
2. Representative are Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters Local No. 1231, 127 N. J. Eq.
533, 14 A. (2d) 45 (1940) ; Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union No. 422, 84 N. J. Eq. 633, 95
Atl. 182 (1915); H. H. Meyer Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, 18 Ohio N. P. (:..s.)
457 (C. P. 1916). See Notes (1920) 6 A. L. I. 934, (1922) 16 A. L. R. 234, (1923)
27 A. L. R. 655, (1938) 116 A. L. R. 50, (1942) 136 A. L. R. 1456. The authorities
are collected in 1 TELLzn, op. cit. supra note 1, § 123. Contra: Fortenbury v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. (2d) 405, 106 P. (2d) 411 (1940); People v.
Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989 (1939) ; Mason & Dixon Lines v. Odom, 18 S. E.
(2d) 841 (Ga. 1942); Ellingsen v. 'Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E.
(2d) 349 (1941); faywood Farms Co. v. filk Wagon Drivers' Union, 313 Ill. App.
24, 38 N. E. (2d) 972 (1942); Byck Bros. & Co. v. Martin, 4 C. C. H. Labor Cases
160,430 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1941); Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 195
So. 791 (La. App. 1940) ; People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 231, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941) ;
Engelmeyer v. Simon, 148 Misc. 621. 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Alliance
Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152 (1941); Haibach v. Carpen-
ters Union, 2 Prentice-Hall Labor Cases 1122,482 (Ct. Com. Pls., Erie Co., Pa., 1941).
3. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
4. Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of Internat. Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Wohl, 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (U. S. 1942); Carpenters and Joiners Union of
America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. S07 (U. S. 1942).
5. 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd newn. 259 App. Div. 863, 19 N. Y. S.
(2d) 811 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd met., 284 N. Y. 708, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940), cert.
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In the Ritter case members of the Carpenters and Joiners Union picketed
in front of a restaurant whose sole proprietor had awarded a building con-
tract to a contractor who employed non-union labor.0 The picketing was
completely peaceful and the placards truthful in every respect.7 Yet the
Texas court enjoined the picketing8 as a violation of the state anti-trust
law. 9 IP a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground
that there existed no "economic interdependence of all engaged in the same
industry"'1 and that the restaurant business, "as a business, has no nexus
with the building dispute." '
The rule apparently laid down in the two cases is that secondary picketing
will be upheld as a valid exercise of free speech only if the same industry
is involved and the unfair product can be followed into the hands of a re-
tailer who resells it for profit. This doctrine ignores the principle of the
denied, 313 U. S. 572 (1941), federal qerestion certified, 285 N. Y. 843, 35 N. E. (2d)
506 (1941), on rehearing cert. granted and judgment rev'd ient., 313 U. S. 548 (1941),
rehearing granted and previous judgment vacated, 314 U. S. 701 (1941), stale court r "d,
62 Sup. Ct. 816 (U. S. 1942).
6. The fact that the third party is under contract to the primary employer should
make no difference. Stilwell Theatre v.'Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932) ;
Haibach v. Carpenters Union, 2 Prentice-Hall Labor Cases g1 22,482 (Ct. Coin, Pls.,
Erie Co., Pa., 1941). See Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 341, 357.
7. Originally a single picket carried this sign: "This Place is Unfair to Car-
penters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 and Painters Local No. 130, Affili-
ated with American Federation of Labor." Later, and before the injunction issued, the
wording was changed to read: "The Owner of this Cafe has awarded a Contract to
Erect a Building to W. A. Plaster who is unfair to the Carpenters Union 213 and
Painters' Union 130, Affiliated with the American Federation of Labor."
8. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 138
S. W. (2d) 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (appeal from order granting temporary injunc-
tion); 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (appeal from order granting per-
manent injunction), writ of error refunsed, 136 Tex. 414 (1941).
9. TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 7426, 7428. The Texas court's
opinion, contrary to the statement of Frankfurter, J., was not the result of a careful
balancing of the community's interest against the individual's right of free speech. Bor-
den Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) involved the same facts as the Wohl case. The case came before the same
court, the same statutes and precedents were discussed, and the opinion was written by
the same judge as in the Ritter case. And again peaceful picketing was enjoined. There
was thus no attempt by the Texas courts to regulate the use of its streets by a reason-
able exercise of the state police power. See Black, J., dissenting in Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 305 (1941), regarding misinterpretation
of state court's holding by Frankfurter, J.
10. The picketing which took place here could not have been enjoined by federal
courts under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 el seq.
(Supp. 1941). See Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Con-
solidated Terminal Corp. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, 33 F. Supp. 645
(D. C. 1940).
11. But cf. Haibach v. Carpenters Union, 2 Prentice-Hall Labor Cases 1 22,482 (Ct.
Com. Pls., Erie Co., Pa., 1941) (facts same as in Ritter case except that the non-union
construction was an addition to an already existing building). I
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"unity of interest" test used in some of the states.12 For example, there is a
strong argument against the application in the Rittcr case. The Court there
concludes that the restaurant owner is a "stranger" to the dispute between
the non-union building contractor and the Carpenters' Union. Nevertheless
Ritter was the person really responsible for the fact that Union men were
not employed. Practically speaking, the third party who continues to buy
the product of an "unfair" manufacturer at a depressed price is not a "neu-
tral", for he profits by the working conditions against which the primary
employer's workers are striking. In the instant case, Ritter gained financially
through the use of non-union labor and was thereby enabled to compete more
successfully with restaurant owners who employed unicin contracturs.13
That one who uses non-union services receives the same surt of economic
benefit as one who resells non-union products has been inmpliedly recognized
in New York.' 4 If there is no distinction between the two, then it is difficult
to reconcile the Wohl and Rittcr holdings. The right to picket should not
depend upon the type of industry involved or upon whether a product capa-
ble of being physically delivered passes into the third party's hands for re-
sale to the public.3 At least two New York decisions have sanctioned the
12. Fortenbury v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. (2d) 405, 10i P.
(2d) 411 (1940); Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 195 So. 791 (La.
App. 1940); People v. fuller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941); Goldfinger
v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937). Several factors are pertinent in
determining whether there is sufficient "unity of interest" between the third party and
the manufacturer to warrant secondary picketing of the former by the manufacturer's
employees: (1) whether the relationship between the third party (T) and the emplkyer
involved in the primary dispute (R) is so remote that pressure against T can have but
a very indirect effect upon R-if this is the case, then the secondary picketing of T can
be enjoined; (2) whether there are other equally effective means available to R's em-
ployees (E) to obtain the results sought-ineffectiveness of E's pressure against R may
justify pressure against T; (3) whether E is arbitrarily singling out T as the object
of pressure while not subjecting other persons similarly situated to the same treatment.
Under any one of these criteria "unity of interest" could be found between Ritter and
the non-union building contractor. See Barnard and Graham, Laor and the Secondarjy
Boycott (1940) 15 WASH. L. REv. 137, 160; Comment (1941) 9J0 U. oF P,%. L. Ruv.
201, 214.
13. See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 284, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 913 (1937).
14. People v. fuller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941). Here a dispute
existed between a union and a company installing and maintaining a burglar alarm ap-
paratus. Judge Finch dissented on the ground that the complaining haberdasher was
not in the same trade as the burglar alarm company. Thus the Xew York Court of
Appeals refused to follow the "area of the industry" criterion which the Supreme Court
lays down in the Ritter case.
15. One difficulty involved in the case of the "non-deliverable" service is that the
secondary picketing may have the effect of a general boycott of the third party instead
of simply a boycott of the "unfair" product which he handles. The New York courts
have faced this problem in window-cleaning, neon sign, and advertising cases in which
no specific product was being resold. Commercial House & Window Cleaning Co., Inc.
v. Awerkin, 138 'isc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (window-ceaning);
People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 23S (1939) [neon sign--overruled by
People v. fuller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941)J; M le. Rtif v. Randau, 1t
IMisc. 247, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (advertising). Accord: Evening Times
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cooperation of dockworkers and building trades unions in aid of teamsters
on the ground that transportation workers are a part of the industry which
they serve. 16 Carpenters, joiners, and painters should likewise be considered
part of the industry which benefits from their labor.
But even granting that the Wohl and Ritter cases are distinguishable on a
"following-the-subject-matter-of-the-dispute" rationale, the "area of the indus-
try" criterion laid down in the latter case presents embarrassing administrative
difficulties. Mr. Justice Reed points out in dissent: "We are not told whether
the test of eligibility to picket is to be applied by crafts or enterprises or how
we are to determine economic interdependence or the boundaries of particular
industries."'17 If, for example, a single individual were engaged in two sepa-
rate industries, in one of which there was a labor dispute, then apparently
business A would be immune from picketing because, "as a business, it has
no nexus" with the dispute in business B, even though one proprietor were
common to both. Or suppose that the "real adversary" of the Carpenters'
Union, the non-union contractor, were also engaged in the restaurant busi-
ness, his restaurant then would seem to be immune from picketing because
the restaurant business, "as a business, has no nexus with the building dis-
pute."' 8 Or assume the dispute arose because an addition to Ritter's present
cafe was being constructed with non-union labor.1 Presumably the Car-
penters' Union could picket where the unfair construction was actually taking
place.2 0 Would the Court attempt to draw a precise line in front of the res-
taurant and allow picketing only of the actual frontage of the additional
Printing & Pub. Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Ati, 598
(1938). The same obstacle was present in the Ritter case since the Union placards neces-
sarily had to ask that the restaurant be boycotted generally. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, makes no mention of this fact in its holding. The Restatement of Torts takes the
position that, when the pickets cannot possibly suggest a limited withholding of patron-
age, a general boycott will be permitted. RESTATMENT, TORTS (1939) § 808, comment b.
16. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 245 App. Div. 262, 281 N. Y. Supp.
647 (2d Dep't 1935), af'd iere., 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 688 (1935), cert. denied,
298 U. S. 684 (1936); Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 624 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934). See Hellerstein,
supra note 6, at 348, 368-69.
17. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 62
Sup. Ct. 807, 815 (U. S. 1942).
18. There is no intimation in the majority opinion of the result that would be reached
if the Union picketed the contractor's residence. The problem of two separate industries
would certainly not be involved. Would the "area" of the building industry be held to
include a non-union contractor's home as well as his place of business?
19. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1939) § 805, illustration 2. If the Restatement is
followed, it appears that Ritter's restaurant employees could strike secondarily in protest
against non-union carpenters making repairs of constructing an addition to the restau-
rant. Cf. Haibach v. Carpenters Union, 2 Prentice-Hall Labor Cases 122,482 (Ct, Com.
Pis., Erie Co., Pa., 1941). If there is sufficient "interest" between the restaurant em-
ployees and the union carpenters for a legal secondary strike, then there ought to be
sufficient "interest" to permit the picketing of Ritter's restaurant by the Carpenters
Union.
20. But if the Court's opinion is strictly followed, even this picketing could be for-
bidden on the ground that two separate industries are involved.
[Vol, 511212
construction? Or, again, suppose there were new construction, to he used
by Ritter as another restaurant. 21 If picketing were limited to the site of
the new restaurant, then Ritter's present trade would not be injured. But
if the picketing occurred because of an addition to present facilities, then
Ritter's immediate restaurant trade would certainly suffer. The Court then
would seem to be, by result if not by rationale, in the anomalous position of
making the geography of non-union work rather than the "area of the indus-
try" the decisive factor in determining fundamental rights.
The point of distribution of goods or services is a logical place for work-
ers to appeal to the consuming public for aid.Y Indeed picketing in front of
a retail store, as in the Ritter case, is often the only effective way of reaching
the publicZ---a fact which the Supreme Court seemed to recognize in per-
mitting secondary picketing in the Vohl case.2 A building in process of
construction is not one being patronized by the public. And once a building
is occupied by tenants there is little advantage in further picketing against
the builder. To picket the contractor at the place of construction has long
been recognized by the building trades unions as almost useless. Further,
the view of the majority that "restriction of peaceful picketing to the area
of the industry leaves open to the disputants other traditional modes of com-
munication" seems directly contrary to a previous Court pronouncement in
Schneider v. State.25 There it was said that liberty of expression in appro-
priate places cannot be abridged simply on the ground that it can be exer-
cised elsewhere.20 For the Carpenters' Union to reach the public via news-
papers, the radio, circulars, or announcements at public meetings-" would
entail much greater expense than picketing. Perhaps, if the "no nexus" rule
were consistently followed, the use of even these means of communication
would be enjoined since they, like the picketing, might cause the boycott uf
an industry which is not concerned in the primary dispute.
21. See Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S. W. (2d) 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Appar-
ently the Texas courts would not permit any reference to Ritter even at the site of the
new construction, many blocks awvay from Ritter's cafe.
22. See Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 350.
23. Compare: "To count the cost of union weapons is to count the cost of free
competition in industrial controversy. Without breeding other ills and, above all, Vith-
out hurting the prestige of law, that cost is not to be diminished by curtailing in the
name of law the most effective union tactics." FLNx.vrT1R AND GP.:UE, TEn LA.)n
Ixjuxc-nrox (1930) 205.
24. "But so far as we can tell, respondents' [the peddlers'] mobility and their insu-
lation from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible for petitioners to
make known their legitimate grievances to the public whose patronage vs sustaining
the peddler system except by the means here employed and contemplated." Bakery and
Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of Internat. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. WohI,
62 Sup. Ct. 816, 819 (U. S. 1942).
25. 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
26. Id. at 163. But see Jones v. Opelika, 10 U. S. L. WEEx 4462, 4464 (U. S. 1942).
27. Essentially there is no difference between the distribution of circulars, pamph-
lets, and cards and the display of a printed statement on a banner carried by a picket.
See Feinberg, Picketing, Free Speech, and "Labor Disputes" (1940) 17 X. Y. U. L Q.
Rav. 385, 401.
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The inconsistency in the Wohl and Ritter opinions, handed down on the
same day, reflects the uncertainty of the Court in peaceful picketing casesY
In the former a state policy was unhesitatingly condemned; in the latter
deference was paid to a state determination. The majority is not oblivious
to the criticism of those who say that the analogy to free speech is unwise
because incomplete.2 9 Apparently this bare majority is alarmed at the pros-
pects of peaceful picketing in non-labor disputes and the consequent judi-
cial hamstringing of state legislatures if the free speech analogy is strictly
followed. 30 But if there is to be a retreat from the Thornhill doctrine, it
would be less confusing if the Court would say so. With the worded
affirmation of the Thornhill philosophy in the Carlson3' and Siving"
cases the doctrinal issue was believed moot. The high court at last
appeared to accept the Holmesian rule, "Let the public decide",83 So long as
traditional safeguards-truthful placards, no violence, no blocking of en-
trances and exits-are maintained, 34 there seems no justification for
interference with the process of telling the consumers the truth,m whether
28. The reluctance of the Court to admit that secondary picketing no longer neces-
sarily implies illegality is analogous to the former unwillingness of the courts to grant
that there might be lawful picketing. See (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 282, 284.
29. Such critics contend that picketing, even though peaceful, is not directed towards
the intellect and is not, therefore, within the idea-protecting purpose of a free speech
rationale. The picket appeals basically to sympathy and to the customer's sense of em-
barrassment rather than to reason; the union rule never to cross a picket line is a con-
cept antithetical to faith in the healthfulness of discussion and debate; tile issues involved
in a single labor dispute are too complex to be encompassed by a mere banner or pla-
card; the employer usually keeps silent-these are some of the more common attacks
upon the free speech analogy. See 1 TELLaR, op. cit. supra note 1 (Supp. 1941) at 54
et seq.
30. Under a logical extension of the rationale there would be legalized picketing of
residences, picketing in jurisdictional disputes, picketing for a closed shop where a union
is closed to competent non-union workers, picketing to induce a small business to hire
more employees, picketing by racial and religious minorities, picketing by competitors
to enforce rules of competition, picketing in violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, etc.
31. Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
32. A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941). There was no intimation here that
the result would have been different had the picketing been done by teamsters or car-
penters.
33. "Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the
clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
34. It is difficult to understand the statement of Frankfurter, J., that the granting
of the Union's contentions here would make peaceful picketing "wholly immune from
regulation by the community in order to protect the general interest." 62 Sup. Ct. 807,
809 (1942). As pointed out by Reed, J., in dissent, id. at 815: "We do not doubt the
right of the state to impose not only some but many restrictions upon peaceful nicketing.
Reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful placards, open ingress and egress, suitable hours
or other proper limitations, not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties, may
be required."
35. The tendency is to widen the opportunities for consumers to secure facts about
the products they buy. See Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 350.
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it be done by picket sign, by pamphlet, or by announcement at a public gath-
ering. And if public opinion is to decide industrial contests, then individuals
who are injured by the workers' exercise of their right of appeal to the pub-
lic should have no recourse against laborY33
Opponents of labor, ever since the Thornhill doctrine was announced,
have concentrated on establishing lines beyond which picketing could not be
employed. That important objective was partially attained in the .Icadow-
moor case 37 with its "background of violence" restriction. Since traditional
anti-labor courts have shown a desire to avoid the free speech labor decisions
of the court, the decision of the majority in the Ritter case will provide an
opportunity to find "no nexus" if two separate industries are concerned.
CANCELLATION OF CITIZENSHIP BECAUSE OF COMMUNISM*
VARTIME pressure for political conformity has given new impetus to
government action designed to restrict radical activities.1 Restrictive tech-
niques have in the past included legislative investigations,2 the enforcement
of criminal syndicalism statutes,3 the closing of government jobs 4 and the
exclusion of left-wing parties from the ballot.l
36. If the picketed one has been granted every means of peacefully fighting bad:
but still loses the battle because public opinion has ruled against him, he has not been
destroyed economically any more than the many employers defeated in labor strikes. All
that he has lost is a little of the individualism he formerly possessed. See Comment
(1941) 41 CoL. L. R . 89, 104 n. 97; Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 352.
37. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadoxvmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
* United States v. Schneiderman, 119 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. grant-
ed, 314 U. S. 597 (1941).
1. See Cushman, National Dcfense and Restriction of Civil Liberties (1941) 9
KAN. CITY L. REv. 63; O'Brian, Restraints Upon Individual Freedom in Times of Na-
tional Emergency (1941) 26 Co.,. L. Q. 523; but see LIBERTY'S NATIO.AL E!.IELMCE-
(1941), annual report of American Civil Liberties Union.
2. The Rapp-Coudert Committee in New York, the Dies Committee in Washington,
and the Yorty Committee in California have all made much use of newspaper publicity.
See Legislative Investigations (1941) 9 Isrr. JURID. Ass'x BULL. 73.
3. State criminal syndicalist laws: State v. Sentner, 230 Iowa 590, 293 N. Mr. 813
(1941), 36 ILl. L: .REv 357; 14 EQUAL JUSTIcE No. 2 (1941) (Oklahoma); (1941)
CIVI. LmERTms Q. No. 40, p. 1, 3. On the Federal Smith Act, see Nov,%:, WITCH HUNT
IN IANNEsoTA (1941); American Civil Liberties Union, SE.DioN (1941); CuArE,
FroE SPEcH IN UNITED STATES (1941) c. 15; Symposiuim on Civil Liberties (1941) 9
Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 881; (1941) 41 COL L. REv. 159. Radicals have been prosecuted on
other charges. See (1941) 9 INT. JuRID. Ass'N BULL. 122 (inaccurate election registra-
tion); (1942) CIVIL LmERTIs Q. No. 44, p. 3 (fraud in collection of election petition
signatures).
4. E.g., New York's Devaney Act, CIVIL SERVICE LAw § 12a; 1941 U. S. Emergency
Relief Appropriations Act, § 15(f), 54 STAT. 620 (1940) : see (1941) 15 ST. Jomn's L.
REv. 335; Smith, Current Attacks ons Our Civil Liberties (1941) 1 NAt. LWVELS GUILD
Q. No. 4, p. 5.
5. See Alard, The Communist Party and the Ballot (1941) 1 BILL, OF RIGHTS REv.
286; Legis. (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 155. Banning has been accomplished indirectly, by
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A newer method of attack, which emphasizes the popular tendency to
equate foreign birth with extremism, is suggested by a recent case."
Schneiderman, an official of the California branch of the Communist Party,
was a naturalized citizen. In his petition for naturalization and in his declara-
tion of intention to become a citizen he had disavowed any opposition to
organized government and affirmed his attachment to the principles of the
Federal Constitution. On the other hand, he had not been asked nor had
he volunteered information concerning his Communist Party membership.
The Government brought suit to cancel his certificate of naturalization, on
the ground that it had been illegally and fraudulently issued, and has been
upheld in the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. The District
Court held that the certificate had been illegally procured, on the theory that
the defendant's party membership at the time of naturalization pr.evented
fulfillment of the statutory requirement that a prospective citizen must have
"behaved as a person . . . attached to the principles of the Constitution
of the United States." Secondly, the District Court found that the certifi-
cate had been obtained by fraud because the defendant had misled the
naturalization court by a false oath of allegiance. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on the grounds of illegality, finding it unnecessary to
determine the issue of fraud.
The government claim that Schneiderman cannot be regarded as a person
attached to the Constitution is to a degree supported by the legislative history
of the Naturalization Act, although it can be argued that Congress in passing
the original Act in 1795 may have intended the phrase "attached to the
principles of the Constitution" as little more than a general norm to be
clarified in the future by legislative enumeration of undesirable classes.8 An
indication that the requirement was simply meant to be synonymous with
"having regard and affection for" 9 the Constitution is found in the early
national policy of admitting to citizenship all persons whatever their political
beliefs.10 However, regardless of the outcome of the argument from legis-
lative history, at the time Schneiderman was naturalized only anarchists had
been expressly singled out by the legislature as ineligible for citizenship;
and not until 1940, if then, did Congress manifest any direct intent to bar
raising petition requirements, see Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 86; or directly by re-
strictive interpretation of the right of a party to a place on the ballot, see (1941) CIVIL
LIBERTIES Q. No. 42, p. 2. California has banned the Communist Party directly by stat-
ute. See (1941) 10 INT. JURID. Ass'N BULL. 47.
6. United States v. Schneiderman, 33 F. Supp. 510 (N. D. Cal. 1940), aff'd, 119
F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. granted, 314 U. S. 597 (1941).
7. 54 STAT. 1142 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 707 (1940) (Nationality Code).
8. See 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1004-66 (1793-95) passim; FRANKLIN, LEGISLATlVE
HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN UNITED STATES (1906) 49-72. The Third Congresg
proceeded itself to include one class-those holding titles or orders of nobility.
9. See United States v. Siem, 299 Fed. 582 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
10. See Flournoy, Nationality Act of 1940, CONTEMP. LAW PAMIpli. Series 5, No. 4.
The short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts were the one exception. See KOHLER, I GRA-
TION AND ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES (1936) 329.
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Communists. Therefore the court in the instant case might well have decided
that a Communist was not ineligible in 1927.11
Despite this doubtful legislative history, courts have sought intrinsic mean-
ing in "attachment to the principles of the Constitution". One criterion
has been whether the applicant for citizenship desires to amend that docu-
ment. At one extreme are the decisions holding that an alien cannot be
attached to a constitution and at the same time desire change in any respect.'2
A more moderate view permits the declarant to believe in change, provided
the desired alterations do not go to basic principles.' 3 Since the Communist
aim of destruction of private property admittedly necessitates a broad revision
of the Constitution, acceptance of the amendment criterion in either form
would disqualify all Communists from naturalization. But this criterion is
fundamentally undesirable, if only because of the subjectivity inevitable in
the choice of basic principles. 14 Furthermore the right to amend can itself
be labeled an unalterable principle. An inference to that effect can be drawn
from the pacifist naturalization cases, where the Supreme Court denied
citizenship only because the declarants declined to limit themselves to
espousal of amendment. 15 The absence of Supreme Court precedent deny-
11. 34 STAT. 598 (1906) barred a "person who disbelieves in . . . organized gv-
ernment . . . or who is . . . affiliated with any organization . . . teaching such dis-
belief . . . or who advocates . . . killing . . . officers . . . of any organized govern-
ment . . ." The present Act, 54 STAT. 1141 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 705 (1940), forbids the
naturalization of any person "who believes in . . . or is . . . affiliated with any . . .
group that believes in . . . (1) the overthrow by force or violence of the Government
of the United States." The conclusion that the earlier act barred only anarchists (and
polygamists) is bolstered by the fact that the background of the provision of the 1905
Act was the assassination of President .McKinley by an anarchist. See Grrys, LAw or
CmzzNsmip IN UNriED STATES (1934) 41. There is no basis for classifying commun-
ists as disbelievers in organized government. But see People v. Immonen, 271 Mich. 324,
400, 261 N. W. 59, 65 (1935), 6 DEraoIr L. REv. 43.
12. United States v. Tapolcsanyi, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); United States
v. Schneiderman, 33 F. Supp. 510 (N. D. Cal. 1940).
13. E.g., Allan v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) ; In re Aide-
coa, 22 F. Supp. 659 (D. Idaho 1938). See earlier cases collected in Hazard, "Attach.
inent to Principles of the Constitution" as Judicially Construed in Certain Vaturalication
Cases in the United States (1929) 23 Ams. J. INT. L. 783. A typical listing of unamend-
able principles is given in In re Saralieff, 59 F. (2d) 436 (E. D. M.o. 1932), 1 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 124; separation of powers, government by representation, dual sover-
eignty of state and federal governments, and guarantees of personal liberty.
14. Whether there are unamendable sections has never been decided. Cf. Comment
(1940) 40 CoL L. REV. 902. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920);
DODD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1941) 1351.
15. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931), 40 YALE L. J. 653 (condi-
tional oath of allegiance) ; United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (1929), 3 U. or
GIN. L. REV. 462 (applicant said she would disobey a law). Moreover, the dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., were applauded by the commentators. Sears, Freund, Green,
United States v. MacIntosh-A Synposium (1931) 26 ILL. L. Rrv. 375; Freund, Unitcd
States v. Schzeimner (1931) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 157. Contra: Wigmore, Unitcd
States v. MacIntosh-A Symposium (1931) 26 ILL L. REv. 375. A recent case reluc-
tantly follows the majority. In re Losey, 39 F. Supp. 37 (E. D. Wash. 1941), (1942)
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ing to citizenship applicants the right to work for amendments finds justifi-
cation in the First Amendment, since its guarantee of freedom of speech
runs to aliens as well as citizens. 16 Moreover, aliens may actually vote, if
state legislatures grant them the ballot, and before 1915 many aliens, thus
enfranchised, voted for the representatives who pass on amendments. 7
One logical extreme of the desire to amend would be the desire to over-
throw violently. Such a belief in means of force and violence is a clear
ground for the refusal of citizenship, particularly where it is accompanied
by overt acts or by any "clear and present danger" of actual overthrow."
It is hard to credit "attachment" to an institution which the applicant
avowedly seeks to destroy.
Where, however, the belief in force is not admitted but must be proved
by the Government, there arise obvious evidentiary difficulties, as well as
the possibility of a miscarriage of justice. In the Schneiderman case, for
example, the defendant protested his belief in peaceful change, and there was
no clear evidence that he personally believed in force. Therefore the court
had to determine two issues: (1) The tenets of the Communist Party;
(2) the correctness of imputation of these views to an individual Con-
munist. The great majority of the lower courts have held that the Com-
munist Party believes in force and violence. Some courts have merely
assumed the belief, others have taken judicial notice of its correctness, and
still others, including the court in the instant case, have insisted on the
presentation of evidence. 10 No court can realistically assume or take judicial
notice of one side of a controverted issue of fact. In those cases where proof
has been required, the evidence offered has been inconclusive.20 Despite
Supreme Court holdings that convention statements are the proper criteria
for determining the principles of political parties, 21 manifestoes, speeches
by individual Communists, and opinions of non-Communist "experts" have
been accepted as conclusive. In the absence of Party statements advocating
force and violence, reliance has been placed upon writings of deceased fore-
40 MicH. L. Ray. 452. Cf. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 509 (1940) (no statutory authority to deny
immigration visa to pacifists).
16. See ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1931)
94.
17. See (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 378.
18. But see Hayes, Revolution as a Constitutional Right (1938) 13 TEMP: L. Q. 18.
The alien may emphasize that not always do the real subversives use force and violence.
He may argue that the clear and present danger test of Schenck v. United States, 2,19
U. S. 47 (1919), makes his advocacy lawful. But it is questionable whether the clear
and present danger doctrine protects one who unequivocally calls for force. See Warm,
Applied Democracy-The Bill of Rights in Action (1940) 14 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 53, 119.
19. For a compilation of cases, see (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 111. Lower court cases
ruling that the Party believes in peaceful change are: Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d)
976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'd on other grounds, 307 U. S. 22 (1939) ; Colyer v. Skef-
fington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd sub nora. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed.
129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
20. See (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 157.
21. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73
(1932).
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runners of the modern Communist Party.- There is a very real difficulty
in discovering the actual beliefs of an organization which, like the Com-
munist Party', has been obliged to operate in considerable secrecv. In
addition, the pragmatic character of Communist statements is evidenced by
constant readaptation and reversal of the "party line". A survey of the
literature indicates merely that the Party may contemplate the use of any
one of a number of methods: (1) the ballot, (2) economic pressure, (3)
force and violence, (4) indefinite large-scale political and economic effort,
(5) self-defense.24
In view of the difficulty of determining Communist Part' dogma, it may
be argued that individual Communists differ in their interpretation of Party
documents, that not all Communists will agree on support of force and
violence, and that the views of members may differ from those of leaders.
Yet the majority of the lower courts, disregarding the evidentiary value of
the applicant's protestations of peaceful designs, have held that membership
in the Comnmunist Party is equivalent to support of force and violence.2
Nor is the fact of membership an easy one to prove. Yet courts, administra-
tive bodies and legislatures have declared such diverse details as the pos-
session of a card, presence at a meeting sponsored by the Party, the lending
of money to the Party, and association with others known to be members to
be relevant evidence on this score.2- That Congress has not desired to make
mere membership in the Communist Party subject to punishment or dis-
qualification from privileges may be argued from the defeat of bills thus
naming the Communist Party.27 Furthermore, despite the IIhitncy case's
22. United States v. Schneiderman, 33 F. Supp. 510 (N. D. Cal. 1940), aff'd, 119
F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941). See Ward, Comm:nist Party and the Ballot (1941)
1 BuLL OF RiGHTs Rm,. 286, 290.
23. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937 1, the Supreme Court expressly
left open the question of the actual objectives of the Communist Party, adding that, "Not-
withstanding these objectives, the defendant still enjoyed his personal right of free
speech." But see Katz, National Dcfcose and Indi'idual Liberties (1940) 16 I:ND. L
J. 31.
24. See (1940) 54 HRv. L. Rzv. 155. The formation of splinter groups further
complicates the issue. The stock Communist answer to literature usually introduced to
show their approval of force and violence is that revolutions are no longer invoked by
manifestoes and that they are prophesying, not preaching. See (19381 43 YA.%L . J. 111,
115. The difficulty of determining what "Communist" means was recognized by Fake,
D. J., when he dismissed as too vague an indictment of five W. P. A. workers accused
of falsely swearing that they were not Communists. United States v. Hautau, 43 F. Supp.
507 (D. N. J. 1942).
25. See cases cited in (1938) 6 IT. JURID. Ass'x BVLL 135; (1938) 48 YIx L. J.
111. The Attorney General has similarly ruled in the Bridges case. N. Y. Times, May
29, 1942, p. 1, col 1.
26. See, e.g., 41 STAT. 1008 (1920), 8 U. S. C. § 137 (1940). See (1938) 48 Y"%ix
L. J. 111, 113; cf. Citizens' Committee for Harry Bridges (19.41) The Sears Opinion,
and (1941) In the Matter of Harry Bridges; The Second Bridges Hcaring (1942) 10
INT. Jupm. Ass'N Bu -. 93.
27. See, e.g., S. 1385, H. R. 3455, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1942. Congress, however,
does now approve of imputation. 54 ST..T. 1141 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 705 (1940) (natur-
alization); 41 STAT. 1008 (1920), 8 U. S. C. § 137 (1942) (exclusion).
19421 NOTES 1219
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
apparent approval of the idea of "guilt by association", the Supreme Court
has more recently frowned upon proscription for mere membership.2 "- The
later view of the Court seems especially applicable to naturalization, for the
provision that one must have behaved as a person attached to the Consti-
tution indicates a Congressional intent to require more tangible proof of
lack of attachment to the Constitution than imputed beliefs.
The broad standard used to determine attachment to the Constitution in
naturalization proceedings is extended to cancellation cases by the Schneider-
man decision. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals gives no weight
to the consideration that greater hardship results to individuals from revoca-
tion of citizenship than from denial of it in the first place. Other arguments
which might have led to a contrary decision are passed over. Through the
rationale that the cancellation action and the naturalization proceeding are
independent actions, limitations imposed by the doctrine of collateral attack
are avoided.28 And since the Nationality Act specifically gives the United
States cumulative remedies, res judicata is no obstacle.29 But several courts,
motivated possibly by the ample investigatory facilities put at the Govern-
ment's disposal since 1926 in an attempt to make the naturalization hearing
no longer perfunctory, 30 have refused to rule out completely the res judicata
defense. 3 1
The Government as plaintiff in the cancellation proceedings must sustain
the burden of proof of showing that the certificate of naturalization was
secured fraudulently or illegally.3 2 It may be noted that in the naturaliza-
27a. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ; cf. Burns v. United States, 274
U. S. 328 (1927). See Borchard, Supreme Court and Private Rights (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 1051, 1073. The recent cases express a contrary attitude by their disregard of evi-
dence of Communist Party views and their emphasis on evidence of the individual's
beliefs. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) ; Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353 (1937) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931) (criminal cases); United
States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r, 273 U. S. 103 (1927) (deportation); cf. dissents
of Brandeis, J., in Whitney v. California, supra, and Burns v. United States, supra.
28. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 (1912). The government has the
right of appeal from the naturalization proceedings. Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S.
568 (1926). Cancellation of citizenship for fraud or illegality is constitutional. Luria
v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 (1913).
29. Maney v. United States, 278 U. S. 17 (1928) ; United States v. Ness, 245 U. S.
319 (1917). See Hazard, Doctrine of Res Judicata in Naturalication Cases in the United
States (1929) 23 AM. J. INT. L. 50. The contesting of naturalization by the United
States makes no difference. United States v. Villanueva, 17 F. Supp. 485 (D. Nov. 1936).
See BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIzES" ABROAD (1915) § 224.
30. Beitz, Naturaliation (1929) 1 LINCOLN L. Rav. 11, 14.
31. United States v. Gokhale, 26 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); United States
v. Sakharam Ganesh Pandit, 15 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), cert. denlied 237 U. S.
759 (1927), 21 Am. J. INT. L. 106; United States v. Ovens, 13 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A.
4th, 1926) ; cf. United States v. Yatsevitch, 33 F. (2d) 342 (D. Mass. 1929).
32. United States v. Der Manelian, 39 F. Supp. 959 (D. R. I. 1941). Since the can-
cellation action is so similar to a criminal case (cf. note 48 infra) the government should
be required to prove virtually beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a mere prepon-
derance. United States v. Knight, 299 Fed. 571 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) ; see United States
v. Sharrock, 276 Fed. 30 (D. Mont. 1921) ; Black, Disloyalty and Denaturalization (1941)
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tion hearing the declarant is held to a strict compliance with the letter of
the naturalization statute,m which provides that citizenship may be granted
upon fulfillment of certain conditions "and not otherwise",31 This strict
construction is further sought to be justified by the doctrine that citizenship
is a privilege and not a right.33 But this attitude has no place in the cancel-
lation proceeding, and given the quasi-criminal nature of the cancellation
action, the Government-plaintiff might well be held to a high standard of
proof in making its case.
Another possible obstacle to the success of the cancellation action is pre-
sented by the fraud count. Although the lower courts have tended to slur
over the manifold common law requirements for proof of fraud,30 on the
theory that the naturalization court should not be denied its right to examine
all facts, regardless of relevance,3 7 some cases have refused cancellation for
fraud when none of the elements was present.3 3 Since, however, Section
Fifteen of the Nationality Code 39 provides alternative grounds of fraud
and illegality, and since "fraud" would duplicate "illegality" if materiality,
and reliance had to be proven, a reasonable assumption is that Congress
meant fraud to cover non-material misrepresentations. On the other hand,
a clue to the meaning of fraud and illegality is suggested by those courts
which limit "illegally procured" to cases of subornation or other imposition
on the court.40 But the majority view equates a lack of meticulous adherence
to the letter of the naturalization law to illegality, regardless of the dishonest
intent of the defendant.4 '
The citizenship of all naturalized persons is made uncertain by the wide
scope given to the phrase "attachment to the Constitution" 2 and in view
29 Ky. L. J. 144, 153. Contra: United States v. Zgrebec, 3N F. Supp. 127 (E. D.
Mich. 1941). The cancellation suit is ordinarily categorized as equitable, not legal or
criminal. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 (1913).
33. United States v. Zaltzman, 19 F. Supp. 305 (W. D. X. Y. 1937). See Comment
(1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 842. But see Priest v. Cummings, 10 Wend. o17, 025 (X.
Y. Supreme Court of Judicature 1837).
34. 54 STAT. 1140 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §701(d) (1940).
35. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472 (1917).
36. United States v. Perez, 29 F. Supp. 883 (E. D. X. Y. 1939 ; United States v.
Parisi, 24 F. Supp. 414 (D. 'id. 1938) ; cf. United States v. Kitchin, 27o Fed. 313 (E. D.
Mo. 1921).
37. United States v. Etheridge, 41 F. (2d) 762 (D. Ore. 1930).
38. United States v. Petrucci, 23 F. Supp. 687 (M. D. Pa. 1933 ; see United States
v. Saracino, 43 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). The Supreme Court has indicated that
fraudulent obtaining of a certificate is not easily proven. Schlivimm v. United Stateb,
311 U. S. 616 (1940).
39. 54 STAT. 1158 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §738 (1940).
40. United States v. Bialoglowski, 101 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 9th; 1939); United
States v. Srednik, 19 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
41. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472 (1917); United States v. Koopmans,
290 Fed. 545 (E. D. N. Y. 1923). Contra: United States v. Orend, 221 Fed. 777 (W.
D. Pa. 1915).
42. See Weber v. United States, 119 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), aff'd, 2 Sup.
Ct. 911 (1942) (receipt of relief evidence of lack of attachment); (1941) Civ. LmEnrirs
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of the unavailability of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral attack
in the cancellation proceedings. This construction defeats Congressional in-
tent. Section Fifteen was passed to insure uniformity and to prevent collusive
naturalization. 43 Instead, the broad interpretation leads to diversity and
uncertainty. 44 The scope of cancellation is rendered even wider by the rule
that actions and statements of the citizen made after naturalization are
admissible as evidence of his prior state of attachment to the Constitution.40
Because of this rule and because the naturalized citizen's utterances and
actions after he has become a citizen provide in practice the impetus for
prosecution of the suit, the naturalized citizen must shy away from the
expression of left-wing thoughts and membership in radical organizations.
Once the citizen's certificate is cancelled, he becomes an alien, and, as
such, is subject to deportation for his views, for Turner v. Williams 40 held
that the First Amendment protects aliens only until Congress decides to
expel them for the use of their free speech. 47 Moreover the procedural safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights are somewhat summary in expulsion proceed-
ing.48 The net result is that the naturalized citizen is liable to banishment
Q. No. 42, p. 2; (1941) Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION BULL., No. 986, p. 1; c. Hazard,
Naturalization and the Prohibition Amendment (1930) 18 GEo. L. J. 199.
43. See United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319, 324 (1917).
44. Fields, Making Naturalization Administrative (1935) 15 B. U. L. REV. 260;
Fields, Conflicts in Naturalization Decisions (1936) 10 TEmP. L. Q. 272; Freund, United
States v. Schwinmuer (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 157.
45. Turlej v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (violation of Pro-
hibition Act) ; United States v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. 908 (D. N. J. 1918) (refusal to
contribute money to Red Cross and Y. M. C. A.); cf. Rowan v. United States, 18 F.
(2d) 246 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; United States v. Tedesco, 31 F. Supp. 322 (S. D. N. Y.
1940). The government has announced a general campaign to cancel for fraud the citizen-
ship of naturalized citizens who support the Axis. (1942) 10 INT. JuRiv. Ass'N BULL.
114. British law makes disloyalty after naturalization a specific ground for revocation.
4 & 5 Go. V, c. 17, § 17(1). See FLOURNOY AND HUDSON, A COLLECTION or NATIONAL-
ITY Laws OF VARIOUS COUNmRIES (1929) 64. A bill has been introduced into Congress
to incorporate a similar provision into American law. H. R. 6250, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942). This bill, which passed the House, would permit courts to cancel the naturali-
zation of any citizen whose "utterances, writings, action or course of conduct establishes
that his political allegiance is to a foreign state or sovereignty." It was attacked by civil
liberties groups. See Hearings before Committee onn Immigration on H. R. 6250, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). But its constitutionality is dubious because it unreasonably dis-
criminates against naturalized citizens. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S.
649, 703 (1898); Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827 (U. S. 1824). And
its vagueness precludes considering the citizen as having voluntarily renounced citizen-
ship. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 312 (1915.
46. 194 U. S. 279 (1904).
47. On this'problem see CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 228-40; Oppenheimer, Con-
stitutional Rights of Aliens (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 100; Oppenheimer, Recent
Developments in the Deportation Process (1938) 36 Micit. L. REV. 355; Bevis, The De-
portation of Aliens (1920) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 97; (1940) 3 NAT. LAWYERS GUILD
Q. 43.
48. The basis of determination of the procedural safeguards is the wording of the
particular amendments-"criminal" or not, "person" or "citizen." The due process
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for expressing ideas which may not be criminal and is not provided the
protection which would be accorded him if he were tried for a crime.40
The disability thus attaching to naturalized citizens is inconsistent with the
lack of power to create two classes of citizensr, and with the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Bill of Rights, which guarantees -freedom of speech to
native-born citizen, foreign-born citizen, and alien alike."' When a clear
and present danger to the government exists, instead of cancellation pro-
ceedings assisted by a piling of imputation upon implication to prove lack
of attachment to the Constitution, the criminal statutes, which do not take
advantage of a naturalized citizen's status, should be the means of punishing
the advocacy of force and violence.52
BERNAID G. VALPINt
clause is limited neither to criminal cases nor to citizens. The alien has the right of habeas
corpus. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905). The alien must have knowledge
of the proceeding and its purpose. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903).
He must be given an opportunity to present some evidence. Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed.
745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); cf. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904). There
must be some evidence to support the executive decision. Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U. S. 8 (1908). Probably the alien is protected against illegal search and sezure.
Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110 (D. Mont. 1920); see Bilokunsky v. Tod, 263 U. S.
149 (1923). On the other hand the alien is not entitled to counsel at all times. Low Wall
Suey v% Backus, 225 U. S. 460 (1912). But see Miers v. Browntow, 21 F. (2d) 376
(S. D. Ala. 1927). Nor does he have the right to compulsory process. Low Wai Suey
v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460 (1912). But see Maltey v. Nagle, 27 F. (2d) 835 (C. C, A.
9th, 1928). Since the rules of evidence do not apply, ex parte evidence is admissible.
Healy v. Backus, 221 Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915). Nor must witnesses always be sub-
ject to cross-examination. Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 Fed. 487 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).
Self-incrimination is no excuse. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S.
103 (1927). An alien awaiting deportation or deportation proceedings is not entitled to
bail. In re Chin Wah, 182 Fed. 256 (D. Ore. 1910).
49. See VANVLEcK, THE AD:IxnIsTaTmA'v CONTROL OF ALrnLs (1932) 149-85;
Oppenheimer, loc. cit. supra note 52; Comments (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rr.v. 1013; (1928) 41
HARV. L. REv. 522; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 380.
50. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1893).
51. See KOHLER, IMMIGRATION AND ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES (1936) 337;
Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 422. But see State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 At. 33
(1921).
52. See DOWELL, A HIsToRY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICATION LEGIsLATio:N IN THE UNITD
STATES (1939); Berge, Anerica's Ans'wer to Subversive Activitics, I. L. D. Yearbco!:
(1941) ; Comment (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 357; (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. RLv. 390; (1941)
1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 55. Compare the treatment in other nations. See Greene v.
Sec'y of State for Home Affairs, 58 T. L. R. 53 (1941); Liversidge v. Anderson, 58 T.
L. R. 35 (1941); Lowenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremnis in European
Denocracies (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 591, 725; Brewin, Civil Liberties in Canada Dur-
ing Wartime (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 112. For a summary of the clear and pres-
ent danger test, see Fraenkel, One Hundrcd Years of the Bill of Rights (1939) 23 MIm:.
L. REv. 719, 751-56; CHAFEE, Frm SPEEcH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) passim.
t Third-Year Class, Yale La, School.
